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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DISCRIMINATION BY STATES AGAINST NON-RESIDENTS'
FISHING AND HUNTING PRIVILEGES
This problem is a very interesting one, though not a new one. States
base their discriminatory legislation on the doctrine of "proprietary in-
terest" and state ownership of the fish and game. This discrimination
is attacked as being repugnant to the privileges and immunities clause
of our Constitution.'
The right to reduce animals ferae naturae to possession has been
controlled from early European days. The common law of England
subjected game and fish to governmental authority and it was treated
as being owned in common. This authority was vested in the colonial
governments and passed to the state governments.
The doctrine of state ownership was established in Corfield v.
Coryell.2 A New Jersey statute3 made it unlawful for any person who
was not a resident to gather oysters in New Jersey waters and provided
for forfeiture of fishing vessels and appurtenances. Plaintiff lived in
Pennsylvania and rented his boat to another who went into New Jersey
waters to collect oysters. Defendant Sheriff seized plaintiff's boat under
this statute and plaintiff commenced an action of trespass for seizing
and converting plaintiff's boat. The court stated that New Jersey had
exclusive right to take oysters from its waters and never ceded this
right. This right was held to be a vested property right for use of the
citizens of New Jersey and the privileges and immunities clause did not
extend to a cotenancy in the common property of another state.
The doctrine of state ownership was applied again in McCready v.
Virginia.4 McCready, a citizen of Maryland, was convicted and fined
under a Virginia Statute5 forbidding the planting of oysters by non-
citizens. The Supreme Court said that Virginia owned the beds of all
tidal waters within her jurisdiction. She represents her people and has
ownership of fish in the water so far as they are capable of owner-
ship. This right comes not from citizenship alone, but is combined
with property rights and is not a mere privilege or immunity of citizen-
ship. The Court there compared planting oysters in a river bed in
Virginia to planting corn in state-owned land.
The source of police power as to fish and game flows from the
duty of the state to preserve for its people a valuable food supply. The
wild game within a state belongs to the people in their collective sover-
Art. IV, sec. 2.
26 Fed. 546, (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1823).
3 Act of New Jersey, June 9, 1820.
494 U.S. 391 (1877).
5 Sess. Acts of 1874, sec. 22, "If any person other than a citizen of this state
shall take of catch oysters or any shell-fish in any manner or plant oysters in
waters thereof or in rivers Potomac or Pocomoke, he shall forfeit $500 and
vessel, tackle, etc."
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eign capacity. It is not the subject of private ownership, except in so
far as the people may elect to make it so and they may, if they see fit,
absolutely prohibit the taking of it, if deemed necessary for its protec-
tion, preservation, or for the public good. 6
Each state owns the beds of all waters within its jurisdiction and
may appropriate them to be used by its own citizens. Citizens acquire
a property right and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship.
State law by which non-residents are prohibited from engaging in fish-
ing activities is not a regulation of commerce nor a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause of our Constitution.7
But in Missouri v. Holland,8 the State of Missouri founded its
claim of exclusive authority upon assertion of title of migratory birds.
Justice Holmes said,
"To put the claim of the state upon title is to lean upon a
slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone
and possession is the beginning of ownership. The whole foun-
dation of the State's rights is the presence within their .jurisdic-
tion of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be
in another state and in a week a thousand miles away."
Speaking of animals ferae naturae, Blackstone put it neatly when
he said,
"A man can have no absolute permanent property in these
as he may in the earth and land; Since these are of a vague and
fugitive nature, and therefore can only admit of a precarious
and qualified ownership, which lasts so long as they are in actual
use and occupation, but no longer." 9
The doctrine of proprietary interest and state ownership has been
weakened somewhat in Toomer v. Witsell.10 South Carolina charged
non-residents who fished in South Carolina waters a license fee for
each fishing boat that was one-hundred times the fee charged residents
for the same privileges. The Court held that imposition of discrimina-
tory license fees for non-residents was without reasonable basis and
was a violation of the privileges and immunities clause which was to
outlaw classifications based on the fact of non-citizenship unless that
non-citizen constitutes a peculiar source of evil at which the state
statute is aimed. The Court said:
"Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and
immunities clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination
against citizens of other states where there is no substantial rea-
son for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are
6 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
7 Anderson v. State, 213 Ark. 871, 213 S.W. (2d) 615 (1948).
8 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
9 2 B1. Comm. 395.10 334 U.S. 385, 396; 402, (1947).
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citizens of other states. But is does not preclude disparity of
treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid
independent reasons for it.
"The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally re-
garded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the im-
portance to its people that a state have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource."
The McCready case can be distinguished from the Toomer case in
that the McCready case related to fish which would remain in Virginia
until removed by man and the latter case involved free-swimming fish
that migrated through the waters of several states and remained in
South Carolina waters only temporarily. The free-swimming fish
should not be the property of any state and should come within the
purview of the privileges and immunities clause.
At present there is pending in the courts a case where a Stevens
Point, Wisconsin business man and some of the Chamberlain, South
Dakota businessmen are testing the South Dakota "favorite son" hunt-
ing law by which non-residents are barred from hunting ducks and
geese in South Dakota. The Wisconsin man was denied a hunting
license and then his arrest was prearranged." Can a state bar non-
residents from hunting waterfowl that is controlled by federal regula-
tion?
Congress has incidental power to make necessary regulations con-
cerning fish and game. States can regulate in so far as they do not
conflict with federal regulation. The purpose of federal regulation is
to protect game and fish and not to interfere with local game laws.'2
The privileges and immunities clause refers to natural and basic
rights. Is not the right to take possession of animals ferae naturae a
natural right? Are animals ferae naturae property of anyone before
they are possessed?
Can we say that animals, birds, or fish beyond reach or control of
man are the property of anyone? It would seem that they are not prop-
erty until possession is acquired. The common law expresses it by say-
ing that which belongs to nobody is acquired by the natural law by the
person who first possesses it. A right of property arises when the thing
is brought under control and subject to use. It would seem that until
fish or game are in possession and control of man and subject to his
use they do not in a proper sense belong to anyone.
It is submitted that discriminatory legislation probably will be de-
clared unconstitutional if independent reasons for it are found not to
"1 Mr. John F. Lindley, Attorney for the defendent, stated that some of the
Chamberlain, South Dakota businessmen were interested because many had
friends and relatives from out of state hunting on their lands and this dis-
criminatory legislation seemed very unfair to them.2 Title 16, U.S.C.A.
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exist. The evil that is alleged by the state must be related to the dis-
crimination against the non-residents through their being the cause of
the evil. To be valid the discriminatory statute should be directed at that
particular evil that the non-residents cause. For example, a good con-
servation measure would probably support such discrimination.
The Supreme Court has spoken regarding free-swimming fish and
,idland water fish, but what about migratory birds and animals? It
would seem that migratory birds and animals that move through dif-
ferent states are within the rule of the Toomer case; they are not the
property of any one state, and come within the purview of the privileges
and immunities clause of our Constitution. If it can be shown that the
birds or animals do not remain in the state and so are not the property
of that state, then the state should not discriminate regarding the hunt-
ing of these birds and animals.
EUGENE F. KOBEY
